THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Students of international politics have for years argued that the concept of power can be used as a fruitful approach in studying processes in international systems. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic examination of the concept so that, like the balance of power, its meaning has remained ambiguous. Some have claimed that the concept can be used to analyze every major phenomenon in international politics. Others have defined power roughly as a means to an end. Some use the term to denote a country's military forces, but when used in this way they are really discussing only a country's military capability and not the amount of influence the country wields in the system.

Hans Morgenthau (1960) is the foremost advocate of the concept of power as the theoretical core of international politics. In his view, all politics is a struggle for power. He derives this dictum from the assumption that the desire to dominate is "a constitutive element of all human associations." Thus, regardless of the goals and objectives of government, the immediate aim of all state action is to obtain and to increase power. Since by definition all states seek to maximize their power, international politics can be conceived of and analyzed as a struggle between independent units seeking to dominate others.

Professor Morgenthau unfortunately fails to submit the concept of power to further examination so that some ambiguity remains.[1] He implies, for example, that power is also a major goal of policy or even a determining motive of any political action. Elsewhere, however, he suggests that power is a relationship and a means to an end. Because of this ambiguity, we do not know what the concept explains or fails to explain in international politics. Does the term "struggle for power" shed light on the many processes that go on within an international system? The word "struggle" certainly does not tell us much about the relations between Norway and Sweden or between Canada and the United States. Does the term "power," defined as the immediate goal of all governments, explain the major external objectives of Nicaragua or Chad or Switzerland?

In contrast to the "struggle for power" concept is the "anti-power theory" of international relations. The proponents of this theory (including Woodrow Wilson) claim that there is a distinction between "power politics"

[1]Other noteworthy proponents of the "power" theory of international relations are Kalijarvi (1953), and Strausz Hupé and Possony (1950).

and some other kind of politics. Not pessimists regarding human nature, they assume that man is essentially tolerant and pacific and that the human community is united through many bonds. Statesmen, they claim, have a choice between practicing "power politics" and conducting foreign relations by some other means. Wilson and others made the further assumption that there is a correlation between a nation's social and political institutions and the way it conducts its foreign relations. To them, autocracies which did not consult "the people" usually engaged in deception, duplicity, and saber-rattling. Democracies, on the other hand, displayed tolerance, morality, and justice, and sought only peace and stability. In the new order which they envisaged for the post World War I period, negotiations would replace threats of war, and world-wide consensus on the desirability of peace would sustain democratic statesmen. In other words, power politics was synonymous with autocracy. But how democratic governments were supposed to achieve their objectives is left unexplained.[2] This view is also of limited use because it is mostly prescriptive: it enunciates how international processes *should* be carried on, but it fails to help us understand what actually occurs.

A third view of power is found in past and contemporary texts on international relations. Authors present the student with a brief and formal definition of power, often equating power with the physical assets a nation possesses. Most texts, in fact, concentrate on the analysis of these assets (often called the "elements of national power") without discussing the actual relations between governments and the techniques by which these assets are brought to bear on the pursuit of national objectives.

Should we not, however, define power in a way which best clarifies what we observe and what we wish to know? A definition should suggest areas of inquiry and reality, though no definition is likely to account for the totality of the subject. Thus, one definition of the concept may be useful for describing and analyzing social relations within a political party or within a family, but it may not be useful for studying international relations. Let us first describe an *act* which we conceive to be central to the process of international politics; that is, the act or acts that A commits toward B so that B pursues a course of behavior in accordance with A's wishes. The act can be illustrated as follows:

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[2]There is room for disagreement on this characterization of the Wilsonian theory of power. Wilson was obviously aware of the role of power as military force and as public opinion. His concept of collective security, where all peaceful nations would band together to enforce the peace, implies that democracies no less than autocracies, should use force when necessary.

A seeks to influence B because it has established certain goals which cannot be achieved (it is perceived) unless B (and perhaps many other actors as well) does X. If this is an important act in international political processes, we can see that it contains several elements:

1. Influence (an aspect of power) is essentially a *means* to an end. Some governments or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake, but for most it is instrumental, just like money. They use it primarily for other goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances.

2. The act also implies a base of capabilities which the actor uses or mobilizes to use in his efforts to influence the behavior of B. A capability is any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement. The concept of capability may be illustrated in the following example. Suppose an armed man walks into a bank and asks the clerk to give him all her money. The clerk observes clearly that the man has no weapons and refuses to comply with his order. The man has sought to influence the behavior of the clerk, but has failed. The next time, however, he walks in armed with a pistol and threatens to shoot if the clerk does not give him the money. This time, the clerk complies. In this instance the man has mobilized certain resources or capabilities (the gun) and has succeeded in influencing the clerk to do as he wished. The gun, just like a nation's military forces, *is not synonymous with the act of influencing*, but it is the instrument that was used to induce the clerk to change her behavior to comply with the robber's objectives.

3. The act of influencing B obviously involves a *relationship* between A and B, though as we will see later, the relationship may not even involve communication. If the relationship covers any period of time, we can also say that it is a *process.*

4. If A can get B to do something, but B cannot get A to do a similar thing, then we can say that A has more power than B *vis a vis* that action. Power, therefore, is also a *quantity.* But as a quantity it is only meaningful when compared to the power of others. Power is therefore relative.

To summarize, then, power may be viewed from several aspects: it is a means, it is based on capabilities, it is a relationship, and a process, and it can also be a quantity.

But for purposes of analyzing international politics, we can break down the concept of power into three separate elements: power is (1) the act (process, relationship) of influencing other factors; (2) it includes the capabilities used to make the wielding of influence successful; and (3) the responses to the act. The three elements must be kept distinct.[3] However, since this definition may seem too abstract, we can define the concept also in the more operational terms of policy makers. In formulating policy and the strategy to achieve certain goals, they would explicitly or implicitly ask the four following questions:

1. Given our goals, what do we wish B to do or not to do? (X)
2. How shall we get B to do or not to do X? (implies a relationship and process)
3. What capabilities are at our disposal so that we can induce B to do or not to do X?
4. What is B's probable response to our attempts to influence its behavior?

Before discussing the problem of capabilities and responses we have to fill out our model of the influence act to account for the many patterns of behavior that may be involved in an international relationship. First, as Singer (1963) points out, the exercise of influence implies more than merely A's ability to *change* the behavior of B. Influence may also be seen where A attempts to get B to *continue* a course of action or policy which is useful to, or in the interests of, A. The exercise of influence does not always cease, therefore, after B does X. It is often a continuing process of reinforcing B's behavior. Nevertheless, power is "situational" to the extent that it is exercised within a framework of goals.[4]

Second, it is almost impossible to find a situation where B does not also have some influence over A. Our model has suggested that influence is exercised only in one direction, by A over B. In reality, however, influence is multilateral. State A, for example, would seldom seek a particular goal unless it had been influenced in a particular direction by the actions of other states in the system. At a minimum, there is the problem of feedback in any relationship: if B complies with A's wishes and does X, that behavior may subsequently prompt A to change its behavior, perhaps in the interest

[3]The recent texts of Stoessinger (1961) and Schleicher (1962) distinguish between the act and the capabilities involved in the act.

[4]State A might also wish state B to do w, y, and z, which may be incompatible with the achievement of X.

of B. Suppose, for example, that state A, after making threats, persuades B to lower its tariffs on the goods of state A. This would seem to be influence travelling only in one direction. But where state B does lower its tariffs, that action may prompt state A to reward state B in some manner. The phenomenon of feedback may be illustrated as follows:



Third, the number of times a state becomes involved in acts of influence depends upon the general level of involvement of that particular actor in the system. The first requisite for attempting to wield influence is a perception that somehow state B (or any other) is related to the achievement of state A's goals and that there is, or will be, some kind of relationship of interdependence. If the relationship covers only inconsequential matters, few acts of influence may be necessary; but the greater the involvement of an actor in the system, the greater the necessity to wield influence over other actors. For example, except for limited trade relations, there is little perception of interdependence between Iceland and Uganda, hence little need for the government of Iceland to attempt to influence the domestic or external policies of the African country.

Fourth, there is the type of relationship which includes what Herbert Simon (1953) has called "anticipated reaction." This is the situation, frequently found in international relations, where A might wish B to do X, but does not try to influence B for fear that B will do Y instead, which is an unfavorable response from A's point of view. In a hypothetical situation, the government of India might wish to obtain arms from the United States to build up its own defenses, but it does not request such arms because it fears that the United States would insist on certain conditions for the sale of arms which might compromise India's neutrality. This "anticipated reaction" may also be multilateral, where A wishes B to do X, but will not try to get B to do it because it fears that C, a third actor, will do Y, which is unfavorable to A's interests. India wants to purchase American arms, but does not seek to influence the United States to sell them for fear that Pakistan (C) will then build up its own armaments and thus start an arms race. In this situation, Pakistan (C) has influence over the actions of the

Indian government even though it has not deliberately sought to influence India on this particular matter or even communicated its position in any way. The Indian government has simply perceived that there is a relatively high probability that if it seeks to influence the United States, Pakistan will react in a manner that is contrary to India's interests.

Fifth, power and influence may be measured quite objectively by scholars and statesmen, but what is important in international relations is the *perceptions* of influence and capabilities that are held by policy-makers. The reason that governments invest millions of dollars for the gathering of intelligence is to develop or have available a relatively accurate picture of other states' capabilities and intentions. Where there is a great discrepancy between perceptions and reality, the results to a country's foreign policy may be disastrous. To take our example of the bank robber again, suppose that the man held a harmless toy pistol and threatened the clerk. The clerk perceived the gun to be real and hence complied with his demand. In this case the robber's influence was far greater than the "objective" character of his capabilities, and the distorted perception by the clerk led her to act in a manner that was unfavorable to her and her employers.

Finally, as our original model suggests, A may try to influence B *not to do* X. Sometimes this is called "negative" power, where A acts in a manner to *prevent* a certain action it deems undesirable to its interests. This is a very typical relationship and process in international politics. By signing the Munich treaty, for example, the British and French governments hoped to prevent Germany from invading Czechoslovakia: the Soviet government by using a variety of instruments of foreign policy, has sought to prevent West Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons; by organizing the Marshall Plan and NATO, the United States sought to prevent the growth of communism in western Europe and/or a Soviet military invasion of this area.

Capabilities

The second element of the concept of power consists of those capabilities that are mobilized in support of the act of influencing. It is difficult to understand how much influence an actor is likely to wield unless we also have some knowledge of the capabilities that are involved.[5] Nevertheless,

It is clear that in political relationships not everyone possesses equal influence. We frequently use the terms "great powers" and "small powers" as a shorthand way of suggesting that some actors make commitments

[5]We might assess influence for historical situations solely on the basis of whether A got B to do X, without having knowledge of either A's or B's capabilities. it should be acknowledged that social scientists do not understand all the reasons why some actors—whether people, groups, governments, or states—wield influence successfully, while others do not.

abroad and have the capacity to meet them that others lack. The distinction between the "great powers" and the "small powers" is usually based on some rough estimation of tangible and intangible factors which we have called capabilities. In domestic politics it is possible to construct a lengthy list of those capabilities and attributes which seemingly permit some to wield influence over large numbers of people and over important public decisions. Dahl (1961) lists such tangibles as money, wealth, information, time, political allies, official position, and control over jobs, and such intangibles as personality and leadership qualities. But not everyone who possesses these capabilities can command the obedience or influence the behavior of other people. What is crucial in relating capabilities to influence, according to Dahl, is that the person *mobilize these capabilities for his political purposes,* and that he possess skill in mobilizing them. A person who uses his wealth, time, information, friends, and personality for political purposes will likely be able to influence others on public issues. A person, on the other hand, who possesses the same capabilities but uses them to invent a new mousetrap is not likely to be important in politics.

The same propositions also hold true in international politics. Capabilities may also be tangible or intangible. We can predict that a country in possession of a high Gross National Product, a high level of industrial development, sophisticated weapons systems, and a large population will have more influence and prestige in the system than a state with a primitive economy, small population, and old fashioned armaments. And yet, the intangibles are also important. In addition to the physical resources of a state, such factors as leadership and national morale have to be assessed. We could not, for example, arrive at an estimation of India's influence in world politics unless we regarded the prestige and stature of its leadership abroad.

Moreover, the amount of influence a state wields over others can be related, as in domestic politics, to the capabilities that are *mobilized* in support of foreign policy objectives. Or, to put this proposition in another way, we can argue that a capability does not itself determine the uses to which it will be put. Nuclear power can be used to provide electricity or to coerce and perhaps to destroy other nations. The use of capabilities depends less on their quality and quantity than on the external objectives that a government formulates for itself.

However, the *variety* of foreign policy instruments available to a nation for influencing others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of capabilities. What a government will seek to do, and how it attempts to do it will depend at least partially on the resources it finds available. A country such as Thailand which possesses relatively few and underdeveloped resources cannot, even if it desired, construct nuclear weapons with which

to intimidate others, or establish a world-wide propaganda network, or dispense several billion dollars annually of foreign aid to try to influence other countries. And in other international systems, such as in the ancient Hindu interstate system, the level of technology limited the number of capabilities that could be used for external purposes. Kautilya suggested in the *Arthasastra* that only seven elements made up the capability of the state: the excellence (quality) of the king and the ministers, and the quality and quantity of the territory, fortresses, treasury, army, and allies (Law, 1920; Ghoshal, 1947). In general, advanced industrial societies are able to mobilize a wide variety of capabilities in support of their external objectives. We can conclude, therefore, that how states *use* their capabilities depends on their external objectives, but the choice of objectives and the instruments to achieve those objectives are limited or influenced by the quality and quantity of available capabilities.

The Measurement of Capabilities

For many years students of international politics have made meticulous comparisons of the mobilized and potential capabilities of various nations. Comparative data relating to the production of iron ore, coal, hydroelectricity, economic growth rates, educational levels, population growth rates, military resources, transportation systems, and sources of raw materials are presented as indicators of a nation's power. Unfortunately, few have acknowledged that in making these comparisons they are not measuring a state's power or influence, but only its base. Our previous discussion would suggest that such measurements and assessments are not particularly useful unless they are related to the foreign policy objectives of the various states. Capability is always the capability to do something; its assessment, therefore, is most meaningful when carried on within a framework of certain goals and foreign policy objectives.

The deduction of actual influence from the quantity and quality of potential and mobilized capabilities may, in some cases, give an approximation of reality, but historically there have been too many discrepancies between the basis of power and the amount of influence to warrant adopting this practice as a useful approach to international relations. One could have assumed, for example, on the basis of a comparative study of technological and educational level, and general standard of living in the 1920's and 1930's that the United States would have been one of the most influential actors in the international system. A careful comparison of certain resources, called by Simonds and Emeny (1939) the "great essentials," revealed the United States to be in an enviable position. In the period 1925 to 1930, it was the only major country in the world that produced from its own resources adequate supplies of food, power, iron, machinery, chemicals,

coal, iron ore, and petroleum. If actual influence had been deduced from the quantities of "great essentials" possessed by the major actors the following ranking of states would have resulted: (1) United States, (2) Germany, (3) Great Britain, (4) France, (5) Russia, (6) Italy, (7) Japan. However, the diplomatic history of the world from 1925 to 1930 would suggest that there was little correlation between the capabilities of these countries and their actual influence. If we measure influence by the impact these actors made on the system and by the responses they could invoke when they sought to change the behavior of other states, we would find for this period quite a different ranking, such as the following: (1) France, (2) Great Britain, (3) Italy, (4) Germany, (5) Russia, (6) Japan, (7) United States.

Other historical discrepancies can also be cited. How, for example, can we explain the ability of the French after their defeat in the Napoleonic wars to become, within a short period of time, one of the most influential members in the Concert of Europe? More recently, how could such figures as Dr. Castro, Colonel Nasser and Marshal Tito successfully defy the pressure of the great powers? The answer to these questions lies not solely in the physical capabilities of states, but partly in the personalities and diplomacy of political leaders, the reactions of the major powers, and other special circumstances. Hence, the ability of A to change the behavior of B is enhanced if it possesses physical capabilities which it can use in the influence act; but B is by no means defenseless because it fails to own a large army, raw materials, and money for foreign aid. Persuasiveness is often related to such intangibles as personality, perceptions, friendships, traditions, and customs, all of which are almost impossible to measure accurately.

The discrepancy between physical capabilities and actual influence can also be related to credibility. A nuclear capability, for example, is often thought to increase radically the diplomatic influence of those who develop it. Yet, the important aspect of a nuclear capability is not its possession, but the willingness to use it if necessary. Other actors must know that the capability is not of mere symbolic significance. Thus, a leader like Dr. Castro possesses a particular psychological advantage over the United States (hence, influence) because he knows that in almost all circumstances the American government would not use strategic nuclear weapons against his country. He has, therefore, effectively broken through the significance of the American nuclear capability as far as Cuban-American relations are concerned.

Finally, discrepancies between actors' physical capabilities and their actual influence can be traced to the habit of analyzing capabilities only in terms of a single state. The wielding of influence in modern international politics is, however, seldom a bilateral process. In a system where all

states perceive some involvement and relationship with all other actors, governments seek to use the capabilities and diplomatic influence of other actors by forming diplomatic or military coalitions. Indeed, modern diplomacy is largely concerned with eliciting support of friends and neutrals, presumably because widespread diplomatic support for an actor's policies increases the legitimacy of those objections, thereby increasing the influence of the actor. "Small" states in particular can increase their influence if they can gain commitments of support from other members of the system.[6] physical capabilities and actual influence, how do we proceed to measure influence? Assessment of physical capabilities may be adequate for rough estimations of influence or war potential and in some circumstances it may suffice to rely on reputations of power. But for precise knowledge, we have to refer to the actual processes of international politics and not to charts or indices of raw materials. We can best measure influence, according to Dahl (1957), by studying the *responses* of those who are in the influence relationship. If A can get B to do X, but C cannot get B to do the same thing, then in reference to that particular action, A has more influence. Or, if B does X despite the protestations of A, then we can assume that A, in this circumstance, did not enjoy much influence over B. It is meaningless to argue that the Soviet Union is more powerful than the United States unless we cite how, for what purposes, and in relation to whom, the Soviet Union and the United States are exerting influence. We may conclude, then, that capabilities themselves do not always lead to the successful wielding of influence and that other variables have to be considered as well. In general, influence varies with (1) the type of goals an actor pursues, (2) the quality and quantity of capabilities (including allies and intangibles) at its disposal, (3) the skill in mobilizing these capabilities in support of the goals, and (4) the credibility of threats and rewards.

How Influence is Exercised

Social scientists have noted several fundamental techniques that individuals and groups use to influence each other. In a political system which contains no one legitimate center of authority (such as a government, or a father in a family) that can command the members of the group or society, bargaining has to be used among the sovereign entities. A. F. K. Organski (1958), Charles Schleicher (1962), and Quincy Wright (1951) suggest

[6]This is one reason why international conflicts seldom remain confined to the original disputants. Recognizing the dangers of increasing the number of parties to a dispute, the United Nations has sought to "isolate" conflicts as much as possible.

four typical bargaining techniques in international politics[7]: persuasion, offering rewards, threatening punishments, and the use of force. These categories are very useful for analyzing the wielding of influence in the system, but they can be expanded and refined to account for slightly different forms of behavior. Recalling that A seeks one of three courses of conduct from B (e.g., B to do X in the future, B not to do X in the future, and B to continue doing X) it may use six different tactics.

1. *Persuasion.* Persuasion may include threats, rewards and actual punishments, but we will mean here those situations in which an actor simply initiates or discusses a proposal or situation with another and elicits a favorable response without explicitly holding out the possibility of rewards or punishments. We cannot assume that the exercise of influence is always *against* the wishes of others and that there are only two possible outcomes of the act, one favoring A, the other favoring B. For example, state A asks B to support it at a coming international conference on the control of narcotics. State B might not originally have any particular interest in the conference or its outcome, but decides, on the basis of A's initiative, that something positive might be gained not only by supporting A's proposals, but also by attending the conference. In this case there might also be the expectation of gaining some type of reward in the future, but not necessarily from A.
2. *The offer of rewards.* This is the situation where A promises to do something favorable to B if B complies with the wishes of A. Rewards may be of almost any type in international relations. To gain the diplomatic support of B at the narcotics conference, A may offer to increase foreign aid payments, to lower tariffs on goods imported from B, to support B at a later conference on communications facilities, or it may promise to remove a previous punishment. The latter tactic is used often by Soviet negotiators. After having created an unfavorable situation, they promise to remove it in return for some concessions by their opponents.
3. *The granting of rewards.* In some instances, the credibility of an actor is not very high and state B, before complying with A's wishes, may insist that A actually give the reward in advance. Frequently in armistice negotiations neither side will unilaterally take steps to demilitarize an area or to demobilize troops until the other shows evidence of complying

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If there are so many factors which distort the relationship between

[7]Francois de Callieres, a renowned French diplomat of the eighteenth century also suggested these techniques when he wrote: "Every Christian prince must take as his chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his rights until he has employed and exhausted the way of reason and persuasion. It is to his interest also, to add to reason and persuasion the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed is one of the surest ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it. *On The Manner of Negotiating with Princes,* trans. by A. F. Whyte, p. 7 (1919).

with the agreements. One of the cliches of cold war diplomacy holds that deeds, not words, are required for the granting of rewards and concessions.

4. *The threat of punishment.* Threats of punishment may be further subdivided into two types:
   a) positive threats, where, for example, state A threatens to increase tariffs, to cut off diplomatic relations, to institute a boycott or embargo against trade with B, or to use force.
   b) threats of deprivation, where A threatens to withdraw foreign aid or in other ways to withhold rewards or other advantages that it already grants to B.
5. *The infliction of non-violent punishment.* In this situation, threats are carried out in the hope of altering B's behavior which, in most cases, could not be altered by other means. The problem with this tactic is that it usually results in reciprocal measures by the other side, thus inflicting damage on both, though not necessarily bringing about a desired state of affairs. If, for example, A threatens to increase its military capabilities if B does X and then proceeds to implement the threat, it is not often that B will comply with A's wishes because it, too, can increase its military capabilities easily enough. In this type of a situation, then, both sides indulge in the application of punishments which may escalate into more serious form unless the conflict is resolved.
6. *Force.* In previous eras when governments did not possess the variety of foreign policy instruments that are available today, they had to rely frequently in the bargaining process upon the use of force. Force and violence were not only the most efficient tactics, but in many cases they were the only means possible for influencing. Today, the situation is different. As technological levels rise, other means of inducement become available and can serve as substitutes for force.[8]

Patterns of Influence in the International System

Most governments at one time or another use all of these techniques for influencing others, but probably over ninety per cent of all relations between states are based on simple persuasion and deal with relatively unimportant technical matters. Since such interactions seldom make the headlines, however, we often assume that most relations between states involve the making or carrying out of threats. But whether a government is communicating with another over an unimportant technical matter or over a subject of great consequence, it is likely to use a particular type of tactic in its attempts to

[8]Presumably, therefore, disarmament and arms control would become more feasible because other instruments of policy can be used in the influence act. In previous eras, to disarm would have led to the collapse of the most important—if not only—capability that could be mobilized for foreign policy purposes.

influence, depending on the general climate of relations between those two governments. Allies, for example, seldom threaten each other with force or even make blatant threats of punishment. Similarly, governments which disagree over a wide range of policy objectives are more likely to resort to threats and to the imposition of punishments. We can suggest, therefore, that just as there are observable patterns of relations between states in terms of their foreign policy strategies (alliances, isolation, neutrality, etc.), there are also general patterns of relations between actors with reference to the methods used to influence each other. The methods of exerting influence between Great Britain and the United States are *typically* those of persuasion and rewards, while the methods of exerting influence between the Soviet Union and the United States in the early post World War II era were typically those of threatening and inflicting punishments of various types. Since such typical patterns exist, we can then construct rough typologies of international relationships as identified by the typical techniques used in the act of influence.

1. *Relations of consensus.* Relations of consensus would be typical between actors that had few disagreements over foreign policy objectives, and/or had a very low level of interaction and involvement in each other's affairs. An example of the former would be Anglo-American relations, and of the latter, the relations between Thailand and Bolivia. In the relations of consensus, moreover, influence is exercised primarily by the technique of persuasion and through the subtle offering of rewards. Finally, since violence as a form of punishment is almost inconceivable between two countries, the military capabilities of neither actor are organized, mobilized, and "targeted" toward the other.
2. *Relations of overt manipulation.* Here, there may be some disagreement or conflict over foreign policy objectives, or state A might undertake some domestic policy which was disapproved by state B, such as a form of racial discrimination. Since there is some conflict, there will also be at least a modest degree of involvement between the two actors, or a perception that A and B are in some kind of a relationship of interdependence. The techniques used to influence will include, if normal persuasion fails, (a) offers of rewards, (b) the granting of rewards, (c) threats to withhold rewards (e.g., not to give foreign aid in the future), or (d) threats of non-violent punishment, including, for example, the raising of tariffs against B's products. Militarily, in relations of overt manipulation, there is still no mobilization or targeting of military capabilities toward state B. Examples of overt manipulation would include the relations between China and the Soviet Union, 1960-1963, and the relations between France and the United States during this same period.

3. *Relations of coercion.* In relations of coercion, there are fundamental disagreements over foreign policy objectives. Almost all actions that A takes externally are perceived by B to be a threat to its own interests. Involvement is, therefore, high. A seeks to influence B's behavior typically by (a) threatening punishments, (b) by inflicting non-violent punishments and under extreme provocation, (c) by the selective and limited use of force as, for example, in a peace-time blockade. Military capabilities, finally, are likely to be targeted towards each other. Examples would include the Soviet Union and the western coalition for most of the period since 1947, Cuba and the United States between 1960 and 1963, Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia between 1937 and 1939, and Egypt and Israel since 1948.

4. *Relations of force.* Here, there is almost total disagreement on foreign policy objectives and the areas of consensus are limited to a few necessities such as communications. The degree of involvement is obviously extremely high. The typical form of exercising influence is through the infliction of violent punishment, though in some instances rewards (e.g., peace offers) might be offered. National capabilities are mobilized primarily with a view to conducting the policy of punishment. However, the quantity of military capabilities that is used will vary with the geographic and force-level boundaries which the disputants place on the conflict.

Though most relations between states could be placed in one of the previous catagories, it should also be apparent that under changing circumstances, governments are required to resort to techniques of influence toward others that they would normally avoid. However, the cold war represents a curious phenomenon in the history of international politics because in the relations between east and west *all* of the techniques of influence are being used simultaneously. There are several areas of policy where consensus exists between the Soviet Union and the leaders of the west and where agreements —either in treaties or through "understandings"—can be reached without making threats or imposing punishments.[9] There are also areas of great controversy where the antagonists commit military capabilities and seek to influence each other's behavior most of the time by making threats and carrying out various forms of punishment.

To summarize this analysis of power, we can suggest that power is an integral part of all political relationships, but in international politics we

[9]Areas of agreement between the Soviet Union and the west which have resulted either in treaties or "understandings" would include the cessation of nuclear tests, the demilitarization of the Antarctic and, possibly, outer space, the renouncing of nuclear war as an instrument of policy, and efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

are interested primarily in one process: how does one state influence the behavior of another in its own interests. The act of influencing becomes, therefore, a central focus for the study of international politics and it is from this act that we can best deduce a definition of power. If we observe the act of influencing, we can see that it is a process, a relationship, a means to an end, and even a quantity. Moreover, we can make an analytical distinction between the act of influencing, the basis, or capabilities, upon which the act relies, and the response to the act. Capabilities are an important determinant of how successful the wielding of influence will be, but they are by no means the only determinant. The nature of a country's foreign policy objectives and the skill with which an actor mobilizes its capabilities for foreign policy purposes are equally important.

The act of influencing may be carried out by a variety of means, the most important of which are the offer and granting of rewards, the threat and imposition of punishments, and the application of force. The choice of means used to induce will depend, in turn, upon the general nature of relations between two governments and on the degree of involvement among actors in the system.

This formulation of the power concept will not, of course, be useful for all aspects of the study of international relations. The categories are mental constructs imposed upon reality for the purpose of clarifying certain aspects of reality. They cannot be expected to cover all international relationships, however. They fail to account for such questions as the determination of national goals or governmental decision-making processes. They will not alert the investigator or student to certain processes in bilateral or multilateral systems that contain complex patterns of economic, technical, and military relations. Questions dealing with trade relations, export credits, or investment incentives—all areas of interest in the study—are often decided on the basis of technical criteria by specialists who cannot mobilize national capabilities for bargaining purposes. Power, no matter how defined, seems particularly inappropriate as a tool for analyzing relations in a highly integrated international community, such as exists in Scandinavia or North America. The concept of leadership might be more appropriate for these relations. In addition, the state A-state B relationship does not seem to account for the activities of various international functional groups (technical, scientific, and economic) which act in concert across traditional national jurisdictions. In short, the concept of power cannot serve, as many have argued, as the core of a theory of international relations. But it can indicate areas of inquiry for further research in international processes and, if formulated carefully, it may become for the first time an important teaching device as well.

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